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Stephen Weber: In six weeks, the G8 will be meeting in St. Petersburg. The prospect of 
this event plus the apparently cooling relations between Moscow and Washington has 
prompted a great deal of discussion about future relations between the two countries. 
President Putin also has moved to the front of the world stage, addressing several of the 
most significant issues of 2006: dealing with Hamas, following their electoral victory in 
January, negotiating with Iran and, to some degree, with the European 3 and the U.S., as 
well about Iran’s developing nuclear program and addressing energy and energy security.  
WorldPublicOpinion.org seeks to bring the voice and values of the public to the 
international policy discussion so I’d like you to reflect today about what contributions 
the voice of the American and the Russian public make to our understanding of this 
international policy discourse. Together with the Levada Center, an independent public 
opinion research institute in Moscow, WorldPublicOpinion conducted parallel polls of 
Russian and U.S. publics.  
We examined how Russians and Americans looked at Iran’s development of its nuclear 
program and what should be done. We also posed questions on a broader set of issues on 
Russia and U.S. relations, each public’s perceptions of the two countries and we also 
included some parallel questions on China to provide greater context to public opinion in 
Russia and the U.S.  
In Russia, the Levada Center used its national probability household sample to interview 
1,000 Russians and they did so in mid-April. WorldPublicOpinion used Knowledge 
Network’s online panel to conduct its national sample of the American public. This panel 
is probability based, designed to represent all U.S. households, including the population 
without online access. The confidence intervals for most of today’s findings will be on 
the order of 3 to 4 percentage points. However, in this survey, and in most surveys, the 
important issues are not going to revolve around small statistical differences but rather 
things like: What do these questions mean? And, what do the findings mean and what is 
their importance for policy? Fortunately, for these difficult questions, we have an 
excellent panel of experts on Russia and U.S. relations:  
For poll results on Russian and American views of Iran click here 
For poll results on Russian and American views of each other, themselves and China 
click here
Steven Kull: I actually had an earlier incarnation in the 1980s studying the Soviet Union 
and conducted a study of Soviet thinking, which resulted in a book called Burying Lenin. 
Based on the writings of the Soviet leaders and the interviews that I was doing at the 
time, I made the case that Marxism-Leninism had been in disarray for some time but it 
was really the alternative ideology and thinking that really displaced Marxism-Leninism. 
And this new thinking really embraced the Universalist vision that was established in the 
post-war period. And central to this thinking was the idea that international legitimacy 
rose from multilateral consensus expressed largely through the United Nations. It also 
embraced the idea of a democratic process being the source of legitimacy for domestic 
government.  
So a real question now has been: Is this all washed away? Is this still alive? Are Russians 
going off on another tangent? Are they returning to authoritarianism? Where could this 
lead in terms of ideology?  
We have been doing some polling in Russia. Over the last year and a half, we did two 
polls together with Globescan for the BBC. We’ve also looked at polling for some other 
organizations. And I’d just like to point out a few findings that I think are relevant to this 
question.  
The first is that it does appear that at least a majority of Russians are still pretty much on 
board with the Universalist vision. I think probably the most striking question was one 
for the BBC that we did that asked about the prospect of the U.N. being significantly 
more powerful in world affairs, would that be something positive or something negative. 
And 57 percent said that they thought it would be positive. Only 11 percent said it would 
be negative. There were quite a few opt outs.  
Now, they’re not entirely enthusiastic about the U.N. performance. Only 38 percent were 
positive on that. […] But the principle of the U.N. playing a bigger role in the world is 
still very popular. A plurality favored the idea of adding more members to the U.N. 
Security Council. And, also, we asked, well, how do you feel about the idea of the U.N. 
Security Council having the power to override the veto of permanent members, including 
your country? Well, Russians were divided. They weren’t opposed. They were divided 
with about half not even answering. Americans, by the way, were positive on that.  
Now are Russians recoiling from democracy? Well, clearly there has been major 
economic and political disarray since the collapse of the Soviet Union and there is a lot of 
evidence that their enthusiasm for democracy has been in some decline. But when asked, 
do you think it’s important for Russia to be a democratic country, 61 percent say that it is 
important. Only 21 percent say it’s unimportant. And this view that it is important rises 
with education. At the lowest level of education, it’s 41 percent rising all the way up to 
78 percent at higher levels of education. It also rises with income. It’s also higher in 
Moscow. An important question is what do Russians think other Russians think. And 59 
percent assume that most Russians think that it’s important that Russia be a democratic 
country.  
Now, how do Russians feel about an authoritarian system? The Eurasia Barometer asked: 
For our country, the most suitable thing is to be a democratic country? Or to have 
something more rigid and centrally planned? Well, 50 percent went for democratic 
government, 35 percent for something rigid and centrally planned. On the question of the 
NGOs, and all that they might be up to, which has concerned some in the Russian 
government, that doesn’t seem to be a widespread view. Only 6 percent of Russians in 
the BBC poll had a negative view of NGOs. Fifty-three percent had a positive view.  
We’ve also had some conversations on this question with our colleagues at the Levada 
Center. The way they interpret it, which we concur with, is that there may be some 
tendency right now to a kind of Chilean model. The idea that maybe we need to tighten 
up some, maybe we need to have more centralized control for a while. And that way the 
Chinese model looks attractive. But it does not appear there’s been some kind of 
ideological shift. The Chilean model is one that’s really explicitly temporary and it’s 
ultimately an affirmation of that in the long-run we need to come back to something 
that’s more democratic. 
We’re now going to hear from our panelists and I think we’ll start with Andrew Kuchins. 
Andrew is the director of Russian and Eurasia Program here at the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace and he’s on the faculty of Georgetown. Previously he was the 
director of the Carnegie Moscow Center and his most recent publication is U.S. Russian 
Relations: The Case for an Upgrade. He’s currently writing a book that’s quite relevant 
to our discussion today: China and Russia: Strategic Allies, Partners or Competitors? 
Andrew Kuchins: Steve thanks very much. First of all, let me thank Steve and Steve, 
collectively known as Steve squared, and PIPA for co-sponsoring this event today and for 
providing us with this really interesting data. Now let me make a caveat. I am by no 
means an expert on survey research and global opinion. Far from it. So my goal is 
basically to try to appear before you as an idiot savant rather than as just an idiot.  
I’ll make a couple of observations. There are three points that strike me as puzzles that 
need further explanation or further research. And make a further point about Iran. 
The first point is fairly obvious. That this data is very interesting but it would be 
extremely interesting if we were to look at it in time series and be able to compare these 
views with views five years or ten years ago in the American and Russian publics. There 
is some data that might be useful for this but I think Mike and some of the others might 
be more familiar with it. The other point I’d make is that, wow, it would be really great if 
we had the data on the Chinese and their views on these things. I mentioned this to Steve 
Weber just before we started and I know that is more difficult to come by. But these two 
points will come up in a couple of questions that I raise about the data itself. 
The first thing that strikes me in looking at this comparison of American and Russian 
public opinion is how ambivalent Americans are about almost everything. And how sure 
the Russians are about almost everything. Americans are ambivalent about their 
president, Americans are ambivalent about use of force, Americans are ambivalent about 
the role of Russian foreign policy, Americans are ambivalent about the role of Chinese 
foreign policy. The only thing Americans are not ambivalent about is that the American 
system of government is superior to the Russians’ and the Chinese and probably 
everybody else’s if you had other data available. Of that we seem to be quite sure. 
The Russians, on the other hand, are very sure that their president is the right guy –85 
percent. They are very sure—80 percent—that Russia is playing a positive role in the 
world. They are very sure, surprisingly sure, and I’ll say more about this in a second, 
about the role of China in the world and quite positive about it. And they’re not so 
ambivalent about so many things. I just point that out, and I think it may suggest 
differences in political culture between Americans and Russians. 
The three puzzles that strike me in this data. The first one I’ve referred to: The Russians 
being so positive about China and Chinese foreign policy. I find it a little bit surprising 
that the view is as positive as it is. And I would be very wary of extrapolating from this 
piece of data that Russians view China as a more promising international partner in the 
longer term.  
This is certainly something I’m going to be looking into and thinking very hard about in 
the next year or two as I get further into this book project. But I have a lot of skepticism 
about that and, on this question in particular, I think it would be useful to have time series 
data. How durable is this positive view about China? How much has it changed over 
time? How much of it can be correlated to the negative perception of the Bush 
administration and U.S. foreign policy in the world? Because I think that for the Russians 
it’s the view of what the United States does that drives how they view China. So I am a 
little bit dubious about just how firm this is.  
On the one hand, it’s easy for me to understand why they think this way. For one, they’re 
fed a fairly steady diet on TV, especially, about how wonderful the Sino-Russian 
relationship is. How positive it is. They see very few images about positive cooperation 
with the United States, etc. I spent two and a half years in Moscow, just getting back at 
the end of last year, and I apologize for repeating this to some here in the audience, but 
that was striking to me. Again, the Sino-Russian military exercises, Sergei Ivanov, the 
Defense Minister, he’s the first news story every night, smiling ear to ear. You would 
have thought that the Russians and the Chinese had just discovered the wheel or 
something. They seem so excited about this.  
Very little positive about the U.S.-Russian relationship. That’s understandable. The other 
thing that’s understandable, of course, is that the Chinese and the Russians do share a lot 
of similar views about international relations. They share concerns about the unilateral, 
hegemonic role of the U.S. in the international system. They both promote in principle a 
multi-polar system. They were opposed to the U.S. withdrawal form the ABM treaty. 
They both opposed the NATO expansion. And also, an important note, that has become 
of more importance recently, they both hold very strong views of sovereignty and the 
importance of national sovereignty and about the unallowability of other states or 
international actors to impinge upon national sovereignty. All that is understandable and 
would drive a more positive view by the Russians of the Chinese.  
But there are some real countervailing factors, also. First of all, there’s the attractiveness 
of culture. U.S. culture, Western culture more broadly, I think, is far more attractive to 
the Russian public than is Chinese culture. There’s a strong respect for Chinese culture 
but it’s not attractive in the way that U.S. culture is. This is something that Igor Zevelev 
and I discussed in Beijing about ten days ago. The Sino-Russian relationship is quite 
positive at the elite level but it’s weaker at the societal level. But this data is quite 
interesting and it would bear some further exploration.  
The second puzzle for me in looking at this is the American view of Russian foreign 
policy and Chinese foreign policy and use of force. Actually, I think the discrepancy 
between American and Russian views of potential Chinese use of force is pretty easily 
explainable. We can imagine the possibility of the United States and China using force 
against each other over Taiwan. The prospect of a U.S.-Chinese war is, it’s a possibility. I 
don’t think it’s a possibility with the Russian Federation. I think it’s a lot less realistic. So 
U.S. views of Chinese use of force as being much more negative, that seems 
understandable to me. 
What’s a little more puzzling is the American views of Russian foreign policy. There’s 
the question: Is Russia having a mainly positive or mainly negative influence on the 
world? Positive, 40 percent. Negative, 53 percent. Over the last few years, do you think 
the effect of Russian foreign policy on the U.S. and its interests has been positive? 
[Positive] 51 percent, negative, 38 percent. Now that’s not a huge difference but I think it 
is statistically significant and it’s puzzling to me. I don’t quite understand why that is the 
case. One possible explanation I came up with in thinking about this was that, well, since 
the Iraq war has become so unpopular for Americans, knowing that the Russians oppose 
the Iraq war may be the first question which is preying a bit more […] so it could relate 
to the Iraq war.  
The other question, though: Is Russia having a mainly positive or negative influence on 
the world? I don’t understand quite why there is that discrepancy there. There’s no 
discrepancy on the questions about Chinese foreign policy, they’re consistent. On Russia, 
they’re not. I don’t quite understand that. That would bear some explanation.  
The final puzzle for me. And maybe the most interesting one, actually: Are the Russian 
views of political systems? Here, just to review quickly those numbers, they’re 
remarkably consistent. Fifty-four percent of Russians have a very favorable or somewhat 
favorable view of the American system. Forty-seven percent have a very favorable or 
somewhat favorable view of the Russian system. Fifty-six percent have a very favorable 
or somewhat favorable view of the Chinese system.  
Now those systems are all very different, yet the Russian view is very close in that they 
have the same degree of positiveness about them. It reminds me of the old story of the 
wise Rabbi. To paraphrase: A says this and the wise Rabbi responds, “Yes, you are 
right.” And then B says that and the wise Rabbi says, “Yes, you are right.” And then C 
says, “But how can that be? What B said contradicts A.” And the wise Rabbi says, “Yes, 
you are right.”  
How can the Russians have similarly positive, moderately positive views of all three 
political systems? Well, they must have some sort of sliding scale there. Maybe they 
think: the Chinese system is a good system for China. The American system is a pretty 
good system for America. And that the Russian system is an okay, not great, but okay 
system for Russia. But all around the same number. That is interesting to me. I think it 
would bear teasing out what actually is going on there with the Russians. 
The other comment I would make about that is that in their conclusions about democracy, 
which countries are more democratic, the Russian and American ratings of democracy 
were significantly different. That Russians rated Russian democracy and Chinese 
democracy as being about equally democratic, I found that surprising. I turned to Igor and 
I said, if more Russians went to China, I think they would vote differently.  
But I would not say it is representative of the Russians being hard graders on themselves. 
I think the Russian rating of democracy as being south of the mean, less than five, 
somewhere in that territory, is about right. What I think is wrong is that they’re easy 
graders on China. And that they rate the Chinese democracy too highly. Here it would be 
really interesting to see what the Chinese think about Russian democracy and American 
democracy. And I think the numbers would be different. And I think, actually, if you 
compared what the Chinese think about Russian democracy today and what the Chinese 
thought about Russian democracy ten years ago, well, they’d think that Russian 
democracy today is a lot better than Russian democracy was ten years ago. Or their 
system of government is much better. In fact, when Igor and I were in Beijing ten days 
ago, I heard this term, the “Beijing Consensus.” It’s the antidote to the Washington 
Consensus. It’s a different political, economic, social model and even has implications 
for how you approach international relations. That sounds like a pretty confident country, 
talking about that, right? And they said quite specifically that the Russians have learned 
from us, they are learning the Beijing Consensus. Be interesting to have those numbers. 
Final comment on Iran. The numbers on Iran really struck me as right on. There’s no 
puzzle there for me to explain. That the Russians don’t want to see Iran become a nuclear 
power, understandable, and similar to us, very close. That the Russians believe that Iran 
is seeking to become a nuclear power, also quite similar to us. Difference, though, in the 
degree of worry about it. Russians are a lot less worried. Also not surprising. The 
Russians, as Steve pointed out, view Iran somewhat differently. I think it would be 
interesting if you were to contrast what the Russians thought about, let’s say, Pakistan 
being a nuclear power. My guess is that the Russians would be somewhat more worried 
about Pakistan being a nuclear power than Iran. Interesting to see. 
Finally, of course, the big difference on sanctions, economic sanctions. That’s not 
surprising. The Russians view economic sanctions as getting on the slippery slope toward 
military action, which they are categorically opposed to. But we may be able to find some 
agreement on sanctions. 
Steven Kull: Thank you. Next we are going to hear from Igor Zevelev, who is the 
Washington bureau chief of Novosti Press. He’s been the chief researcher at the Institute 
of World Economy and International Relations in Moscow. And he is also the author of 
Russia and its New Diasporas. 
Igor Zevelev: Thanks, Steve. As often happens when it comes to statistics, what it means 
may depend on who is doing the interpreting. It is hard to make cross-cultural 
comparisons and it may be even more difficult when the question involves perceptions of 
other nations. Opinion trends may shift radically in unstable societies in a short period. 
The most striking and general impressions one got from studying the Russian polling data 
in the 1990s is that Russians became a confused people in the aftermath of the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. The collective attitudes of many groups combined contradictory ideas 
and perceptions. Many perceptions and opinions are not well articulated and remain 
contradictory even today, in 2006. However, having said all that, the biggest surprise to 
me, when I read the data, was that there were no big surprises and very few 
contradictions. 
I would like to make three points. First, the perception of Iran and its nuclear program. 
Both Steve and Andy already said that Russians and Americans perceive the problem 
very similarly. And there are two interesting exceptions. One, the difference in Russian 
and American attitudes toward economic sanctions and another exception is their threat 
assessment.  
I totally agree with Andy that Russians do not see a nuclear armed Iran as that great a 
threat as Americans. Russians view a nuclear-armed Iran as an unpleasant fact but one 
that Russians can live with, as they live with a nuclear armed Pakistan. And the public 
and the elite have very similar approaches to this problem and their threat assessment is 
similar in Russia. This explains a lot when we think about Russian official position on 
Iran. 
The second point I would like to make is on perceptions of China. China, as we saw from 
the data, is a positive example for Russians, and, of course, not for Americans. The 
Russians have a more positive attitude towards many aspects of this country and Andy 
suggested an international relations perspective: probably, they keep the United States 
and its hegemony in the world in mind when they think about China.  
But I would add something to that. I think there may be another reason for this 
discrepancy between Russian and American perceptions of China. I think for domestic 
Russian discourse right now, political stability and order, economic growth and 
modernization, are much more important than democracy. And when they think about 
China, they think about the 10 percent annual growth, they think about their 
modernization, they think about their reduction of poverty and they do not think that 
much about democracy, while Americans tend to pay a lot of attention to that aspect. For 
many Russians, democracy is associated with chaos, collapse of the state, material gains 
of the very few in the nineties.  
I also think that there is yet another factor that may make Russians think more positively 
about Chinese model. I think that most Russians believe there are many models of 
development, there is more than one model of development, while most Americans 
expect each country to become a liberal democracy eventually. And that also may explain 
the difference in perception of China. 
Finally, my third and last point is on perceptions of each other. The most important, 
though not unexpected, result of this study to me personally is the perception of President 
Putin. American public has more favorable opinion of Putin than the American elite and 
the press, and, as Steve also mentioned, this block of the town. Thirty-six percent of 
Americans believe that Putin is good. At the same time, 85 percent of Russians hold a 
favorable opinion of Putin.  
The discrepancy of American and Russian opinions of Putin, per se, is not that 
interesting. The most interesting thing about it is that many Americans who do not favor 
the Russian president think that Putin’s major fault is backpedaling in democracy. It’s 
only natural to assume that Russian citizens should be concerned about it much more than 
Americans. But paradoxically as it may seem, the Russians, whom Putin allegedly 
oppresses, support him. And as Steve mentioned, other polls indicate the same trend.  
So, thinking theoretically, there may be two explanations. First, it may be argued that the 
state of democracy and personal freedoms in Russia is not as bad as many Americans 
think it is. The data of this particular study does not support this argument. It shows that 
Russians are tough graders, as Steve said, and do not give Russian democracy high 
scores. However, this is, I believe, important: A plurality of Russians sees the country as 
becoming more democratic. It would be interesting, by the way, to see what is the 
reference point: In comparison with the Soviet Union? In comparison with the nineties? 
What is the reference point? It’s very important. So this is the first explanation, but it is 
not supported by this data. 
The second explanation of why Russians support Putin is that Russians are less 
concerned about democracy today than about stability, growth, and restoration of 
Russia’s great power status. Putin is viewed as a leader who brought stability, growth and 
international influence to Russia. Well, I personally think that both arguments, both 
hypotheses, that I mentioned can hold. There are many elements of truth in both. But this 
is a topic for another discussion. I think, though, that this difference between Russians’ 
and Americans’ perceptions of Putin and his record creates tension, which is reflected in 
the current state of U.S.-Russian relations.  
In conclusion, I would like to commend the research and I’m looking forward to seeing 
more data collected by you in cooperation with Levada Center. 
Steven Kull: Thank you. Last, we’re going to hear from Michael McFaul, who is a senior 
associate here at the Carnegie Endowment and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, 
as well as a faculty member at Stanford University. He has numerous books, among 
them: Russia’s Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin and 
Between Dictatorship and Democracy: Russian post-Communist political reform. 
Michael McFaul: Thank you, Steve. Congratulations on your panel and more generally 
for the stuff you do. I’m glad to be on your distribution list. I, too, do public opinion polls 
in Russia. We have for about a decade with my partner, Tim Colton, and now Henry 
Hale. For those of you with any influence at the NSF or the National Council if you could 
lobby on our behalf, because we do this every four years. We’re the only group that has 
done it every four years around the election cycle. We ask a lot of election questions and, 
if we don’t get the funding, we’re never going to have that time series data that everyone 
wants. In fact, it’s quite atrocious that every year we’re under the threat of not having 
that. I think it really shows where Russia has fallen. Understanding Russia has become 
less of a priority for Americans. That’s something I’m going to talk about in a minute. 
I’m going very briefly to things that were striking to me. Again, not the obvious, because 
I think a lot of this is familiar. […] First, on the Russian political system. It’s very 
important to understand that we have to disaggregate the opinions about the practice of 
democracy, or the practice of governance, versus opinions about the norms of the 
practice. This was very important in the nineties. When you asked people about the way 
democracy was being performed, of course you got very low numbers, sometimes single 
digit numbers, in terms of how democracy was performing. But that’s because Boris 
Yeltsin identified himself as the democrat. And Russians, under this guise of democracy, 
this leader who called himself a democrat, were living through a social revolution. So 
disaggregating that, when you lump them together, I don’t find that very interesting. Of 
course people were dissatisfied with the performance of their government in the 1990s. It 
was a truly chaotic time.  
When you ask questions—leaving aside attitudes about favorability or unfavorabilty or 
performance—and those things are very much intertwined—Americans are somewhat 
different and other countries too—but when you ask just straight up questions about 
democratic practices, especially if you don’t use the word “democracy” in Russia, which 
has become a kind of pejorative word, there’s lots of support for democracy.  
Should your leaders be elected? Absolutely. Eighty percent. It’s not even 61 percent. 
Should there be checks and balances? Absolutely. Should the press be independent? 
Absolutely. Striking numbers. We can go through them, if you want, in questions.  
So when people say that Russians want a strong hand and flirt with the Pinochet model, I 
really don’t believe it. These numbers have been quite stable through very chaotic times 
in Russia. Moreover, you can’t ask the question about Pinochet, it’s not fair. Because 
nobody knows what happened in Chile under Pinochet in Russia, they don’t.  
You have to ask the question much more precisely. Do they want the military to rule 
Russia? That’s what dictatorship is. Or the KGB? Or the Communist Party? And three-
quarters of the Russian population are firmly: No, we don’t want the military to run the 
government. That’s what dictatorship is.  
So, just as you can’t be abstract about democracy, I think you have to be clear about 
dictatorship. There, I think, the opinions are very clear. What is also clear is that 
democracy is simply not a priority for the majority of Russians right now. So they have 
views on it, and I think the views have been rather stable through very different times 
from the nineties to now. But, as a priority, it’s way, way down the list in terms of things 
that one cares about.  
Given that, the question about the favorability or unfavorability that you have in your 
survey is kind of striking and odd to me. Because I would expect that number to correlate 
with the popularity of the government. But here there’s a big gap. Putin’s at 85 percent in 
this survey, much higher than in other surveys, as is George W. Bush. He would die to 
have 45 percent right now. But that gap is a puzzle for me. How do you understand the 
fact that only 47 percent have a favorability rating for their political system but yet rate 
the guy who’s run it for six years at 85 percent? 
Two explanations: one is he’s not democratic enough. I’m skeptical about that. I don’t 
believe that. That unfavorability rating, it’s filled with some who are worried about 
democracy. But, as your poll shows, that number is really quite small in Russia. There’s 
got to be an explanation for that gap, but I don’t know what it is.  
I have a hypothesis that, in fact, Putin is so popular because nobody can think of an 
alternative. And that also comes with autocracy, by the way. John Kerry gets to go on the 
radio. Al Gore gets to make movies and go around the country talking about it. Mr. 
Putin’s alternatives are not getting that kind of coverage. And so that may be one possible 
explanation. But it demands an explanation. Those numbers should be more closely 
correlated. […] This is not about Russians thinking they’re just as democratic as the 
United States, as your poll shows rather conclusively. I think that’s also quite interesting 
and demands further explanation.  
Second, the positive assessments on the economy, also—big gap—I mean 85 versus 31. 
This is the guy that’s supposed to be overseeing the Russian […] economic miracle and 
yet there’s a fifty point gap between Putin’s popularity and their evaluation of economic 
performance. Interesting. I think we need to understand how that can be true. Again, I 
think it might have to do with the lack of alternatives, the lack of criticism of Mr. Putin in 
terms of his role in the economy. That number looks low but compared to 1995, 31 
percent is a giant, giant number. So that number is going in the right direction. People are 
much more favorably inclined, still a plurality, not a majority, but the number is going in 
a positive direction, rather acutely. But it’s still a big gap when you compare it with 
Putin’s favorability rating. 
Third, just to note it, I don’t think anyone in this room will be surprised, but the support 
for the United States as a model, the negative numbers here, that really is a giant jump 
from ten or fifteen years ago in terms of the kinds of numbers you would have had in 
Russia. I think we can all explain that but I see that as tragic. But the trend line is very 
clear. Those numbers were very, very different in the early nineties.  
Also, on the favorability numbers. I do think it’s important to realize that there’s a reason. 
I don’t think it’s fair to compare it to Bush. If Bush could control all the television 
stations, all the media, and have the first 22 minutes every night to talk about all the good 
things he was doing and we didn’t have to hear about massacres in Iraq and we didn’t 
have to hear about Abu Ghraib, I think his numbers would at least be higher than 33 
percent. Let’s bring some political context to those numbers.  
Briefly, on the foreign policy numbers. Andy talked about the puzzle about Americans’ 
somewhat positive relationship to Russia but somewhat negative about the Russian 
system of government. I think this actually means that Americans have no idea what 
Russia is doing in the world. When we asked our questions on this, we asked that 
question first. You can’t have an opinion about Mr. Putin, if you don’t know who Mr. 
Putin is. Putin, I guess, would get some numbers. But when I saw the numbers about Hu 
Jintao, 90 percent of Americans recorded an opinion about Hu Jintao. I can’t believe that. 
That’s not data. I think if you asked the first question: Who is the leader of China? Most 
people could not answer that question. Interestingly, the Russians in this way were a little 
more honest. The 50 percent non-respondents rate on China was very clear. Americans 
feel that they have to have an opinion when you ask them. The Russians just say, “I don’t 
know.”  
I think that’s the way to understand the variations on the Russians. […] Russia, as a 
subject for Americans, especially when talking about foreign policy, is just something not 
on the radar screen. So I’m not surprised by the fact that they’re confused, they’re 
somewhat indifferent, when they do express an opinion. My guess would be that if you 
did some cross tabs on it, or some regressions on it, that’s all driven by their negative 
view of Russia as a whole and therefore the other negative stuff is about that and it’s 
about democracy. It’s not actually about what Russia is doing vis a vis Iran.  
My guess is that most people have no idea what the Russian proposal on Iran is, I betcha 
half the people in this room don’t. And therefore to have an opinion about that is just 
asking too much of any people, American, Russian or otherwise. So I think those 
numbers show indifference about this stuff. They just don’t know. And on China, I would 
say the same thing.  
Now , two last points on U.S. policy and then Russia-China. U.S. on Iran, diplomacy 
versus bombing, three to one margin. Other polls show that. But when you ask a different 
question, the ABC poll recently did this: Iran with a nuclear weapon or bombing? Then 
it’s fifty-fifty. So let’s be clear. When you get a binary choice: diplomacy or war? That’s 
an easy one, right? Of course, more diplomacy. But when you get the other choice, the 
binary choice: Iran with nuclear weapons or bombing? Surprisingly to me, that number is 
about 44 or 45 on each side of that.  
Then, on Russia and China, just to echo some of the intuitive things that Andy was 
saying, and he knows that relationship better than I do. But I think your data tends to be 
nuanced in two different ways. One is the soft power way that Andy talked about, so I 
won’t go into that. […]. But when you ask Russians: Where would you rather send your 
child to go to school, Beijing or Palo Alto? I know the answer to that question. On all the 
soft power questions, it’s clearly Russians are much more enamored with America and 
tourist questions, I’ve seen too. But that we all know. 
What’s more interesting is the enemy question. And Levada themselves have asked this 
question. I think it was in March of 2006. […] When they asked: Which country do you 
think Russia is more likely to go to war with? Not favorability, unfavorability, but 
actually: Who do you think we’re going to have war with? A very concrete thing. 
Seventy-five percent said China. And only 25 percent said the United States. […] 
I think in the long run when Russians really think about who is really going to be, truly in 
an antithetical way, I think this fear of China, which other opinion polls have shown for a 
long time, this is something I think is stable, that hasn’t changed over time. With the 
caveat that, as Igor said, elite opinion on this has changed rather radically in the last 
decade and elites control media and so maybe you can square the circle here, I don’t 
know. But Levada numbers when you ask about enemy are quite striking and, therefore, I 
think, not as worrisome in terms of this “Beijing Consensus.” I actually think that’s much 
more ephemeral than the current polling data show. Thanks. 
 
